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Reshaping U.S. Smart Power: Towards a Post-Pandemic Security
Architecture
Abstract
COVID19 turned out to be one of the deadliest diseases in history. The United States faced
a series of new challenges after the Coronavirus spread throughout the world. China is
taking advantage of the pandemic to challenge the U.S. global dominance. The main
purpose of this article is to analyze the role of the United States in the postpandemic
security architecture at a global level. The basic claim of the article is that Washington
should reshape U.S. smart power in order to preserve the American global dominance. The
article’s claim rests on the assumption that smart power is the most effective instrument of
U.S. Foreign Policy in the post-Cold War era. It was U.S. smart power that allowed
Washington to maintain its global leadership after the 9/11 attacks. The Coronacrisis will
have longterm consequences for the global security architecture. However, this article
argues that the Coronavirus pandemic will not change the global order.
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Introduction
Almost two decades after September 11, 2001 (9/11), the world is once
again on the brink of a global political, economic and humanitarian crisis.
These dynamics has shifted the balance of powers in international
relations. The purpose of this article is to explore the U.S. strategic
involvement in the post-pandemic security architecture at a global level.
Shortly after 9/11, a number of state and non-state actors challenged the
U.S. global leadership. Crossborder terror networks declared war on
Washington.1 China achieved sustainable economic growth and created a
new model that pretended to be an alternative to the free market.2 Russia
declared the end of America’s global dominance and the emergence of a
multipolar world order.3 European Union (EU) was planning to build its
own defense capabilities in attempt to emancipate from the United States.4
Despite all these challenges, Washington was able to maintain its global
dominance.
This article argues that if the United States wants to preserve its dominant
position in the post-pandemic security architecture, Washington has to
reshape its concept of smart power. Smart power constitutes the
theoretical core of U.S. foreign policy after 9/11.5 However, with the
outbreak of COVID-19, it became less effective. The use of hard power in
times of pandemic would inevitably provoke exhausting conflicts. Military
operations will remain expensive considering the Coronavirus death toll.
United States Soft power, on the other side, also needs to restart.
Washington has to improve bilateral relations with its allies from Europe,
Middle East and North Africa (MENA), and Asia Pacific (APAC). The
Pandemic challenged the primacy of smart power in U.S. foreign policy.
However, more important is that the United States needs a new strategy to
sustain its global dominance.
The research roadmap for this article includes three sections. The first
reviews the basic theories of smart power and introduces an alternative
post-pandemic definition of this concept. The second analyzes the current
implications of U.S. foreign policy. The third operationalizes the postpandemic smart power concept by examining four strategic implications of
U.S. Foreign policy. А brief conclusion summarizes the main arguments of
the article and derives two scenarios for the place of the United States in
the post-pandemic age.
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Assessing and Explaining the Importance of Smart Power
Theory
A central contention in this article is that smart power will shape U.S.
Foreign policy in the post-pandemic age. Therefore, an understanding of
its theoretical importance is a starting point for this section. Most political
scientists and academics appear to agree that hard power determines
Washington’s Foreign policy in Iraq and Afghanistan. For these reasons,
many believe that the United States should continue to use hard power as
a primary foreign policy tool in the post-pandemic security architecture.
Others rely on the presumption that soft power should build U.S. grand
strategy in the post-pandemic age. Such analyses are one sided and often
misleading because they do not consider alternative hypothesis – for
example, there is unchallenged consensus that both hard power and soft
power are integral part of U.S. Foreign policy. Moreover, soft and hard
approaches are methodologically problematic because they rely on most
likely cases from the pre-pandemic security environment: wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq, Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS), China’s
rise, Russia’s New Imperialism. In other words, hard and soft power
theories fail to answer the questions of what will be and what should be
the place of United States in the post-pandemic world order.
Smart power theories, on the contrary, challenge soft and hard power
theories on methodological and theoretical level. Despite their substantial
differences, smart power theoreticians have consistently agree that smart
strategies have the capacity to affect U.S. global leadership. Thus, this
article argues that the United States needs to reshape smart power in
order to maintain the American global order. This section also challenges
hard power and soft power theories on empirical level by arguing that they
have contributed far less to U.S. Foreign policy than the concept of smart
power. The article suggests that the main reason lies in the strategic
inefficiency of soft and hard power during decision making in times of
crisis such as the Coronavirus outbreak and 9/11. To avoid simply
theoretical comparisons the analysis bellow examines a case study – the
9/11 attacks by simultaneously operationalizing three variables – hard
power, soft power and smart power. The article moves beyond
operationalization to explanation why smart power is more effective than
hard and soft power.
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Hard Power, Soft Power, and War on Terror
United States hard power after 9/11 has four basic aspects:
Neoconservatism, unilateralism, multilateralism, preemptive strike, and
war on terror. Washington’s use of hard power after 9/11 came because of
the political debate between neoconservatives and realists. The
neoconservative vision of U.S. Foreign policy provided the theoretical and
policy content of the Bush doctrine.6 Unlike neoconservatives, realists
were circumspect about the use of hard power. Realists argued that the
invasion of Iraq would direct attention away from the real terrorist threats:
Al Qaeda, Osama Bin Laden, and the Taliban.7 Therefore, neoconservatism
shaped President Bush unilateral strategy in the Middle East.
Unilateralism addresses a tendency to opt out of a multilateral framework
(whether existing or proposed) or to act alone in addressing a particular
global or regional challenge rather than choosing to participate in
collective action.8 The unilateral nature of the Bush doctrine draws
inspiration from the neoconservative axiom that superpowers do not need
to act multilaterally. They have the geopolitical resource to choose whether
to act multilaterally or unilaterally. Therefore, both multilateralism and
unilateralism can use hard power as a foreign policy tool. United States
unilateralism after 9/11 has two forms. The active form of unilateralism
advocates unilateral military operations, humanitarian assistance, and
mandatory peacekeeping operations. The passive form involves
Washington's attitude towards international organizations and
international law. For example, the United States does not recognize the
jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. Despite the
predominantly unilateral nature of the Bush, doctrine U.S. military
strategy under Bush administration integrated some multilateral
approaches such as forging coalitions. In March 2003, the United States
led into Iraq a coalition of the willing with the United Kingdom, smaller
contingents from Poland and other applicant states.9
The pre-emptive military strike is a unilateral action taken in defense of
national interests and homeland security. This strategy inevitably involves
the use of hard power under three conditions: Presence, probability and
imminence of threat.10 Preemptive attacks originate from the assumption
that the enemy is about to attack, and that striking first will be better than
allowing the enemy to do so.11 However, if such certainty appears to exist,
striking out first may appear to be the only way to suppress the adversary.
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The War on terror doctrine occluded all but military solutions to the
problem, calling for special powers for a wartime president and
demanding patriotic allegiance.12 The use of military in the fight against
global terrorism involves the strategy of targeted killing. Targeted killing is
premeditated, preemptive, and intentional killing of an individual or
individuals who represent a present and/or future threat to the safety and
security of the state through affiliation with terrorist groups or
individuals.13 A mission impossible approach advocates the elimination of
all potential threats to U.S. National Security.
U.S. soft power after 9/11 has three basic pillars: Liberalism,
multilateralism and neighborhood policy. Liberalism in the post-9/11 era
has two lays: Ideological liberalism (multilateralism and cooperative
engagement with America’s opponents) and theoretical liberalism
(democracy promotion and liberal institutionalism).14 Soft power
determines the multilateral nature of the liberal approach by enhancing
the cooperation between America and its allies. The more the United
States works its partners and allies and through international institutions,
the more legitimacy and support it would gather.15
Multilateralism refers to the cooperation of three or more states in a given
area of international relations.16 U.S. multilateralism after 9/11 also has a
dichotomous nature. Active multilateralism advocates building alliances
and coalitions, enhancing cooperation, and strengthening U.S. presence in
international organizations. Passive multilateralism involves U.S.
adherence to conventions and international agreements.
Neighborhood policy is a concept that dates back to the Roosevelt era. The
concept states that the United States will act as a good neighbor of Latin
America and the West.17 President Obama endorsed and globalized
President Franklin D. Roosevelt's doctrine by enlarging its geopolitical
scope. Obama’s strategy followed four strategic lines: Improving relations
with Europe, rapprochement with Latin America, restoration of the
relations with Cuba, and enhanced cooperation within the United Nations.
United States foreign policy under the Obama administration has ruled
out hard power as a basic approach. Thus, the United States has
significantly reduced its military spending in favor of diplomacy.
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Smart Power and Dumb War
U.S. smart power after 9/11 emerged under the Obama administration.
United States military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have proven to
be an excellent example of the American military strength. However, U.S.
interventions in the Middle East also showed the limits of Washington’s
hard power. United States hard power could not easily snuff out
insurgencies or rebuild broken governments.18 President Obama
announced the end of the war on terror and the beginning of a peaceful
transition to a post-9/11 world order. Nevertheless, Obama's purpose did
not change – the President argued firmly that the United States should
remain a global leader.19 His successor – Donald Trump also rejected the
Sino-Russian vision of Multipolar World Order. Trump’s response to this
concept was to Make America Great Again.
U.S. smart strategy relied on a variety of resources. President Obama's
strategy included a significant reduction in the use of hard power at the
expense of soft power.20 This approach worked in Libya and led to the
collapse of Muammar Gaddafi's regime. The second major success of
Obama’s smart strategy was the elimination of Osama bin Laden.
However, the Obama doctrine was not entirely successful. The withdrawal
of U.S. troops from Iraq created a strategic vacuum in the region. Part of
Saddam Hussein's former colonels joined forces with the radicals and
created ISIS. President Trump revised the Obama doctrine, but continued
to use a smart approach in his foreign policy.21 U.S.–North Korea
diplomatic maneuvers were only part of this strategy. Trump’s approach,
however, was different from that of Obama, who, under the guise of smart
power, relied on soft power.
The smart face of U.S. Foreign policy changed after the financial crisis of
2008. Smart power became much more popular in the White House. For
the Obama administration, hard power was necessary, but not inevitable
and attractive. Shortly before the elections senator Obama shared his
vision on U.S. military interventions:
“I will not hesitate to use force, unilaterally if necessary, to protect
the American people or our vital interests. We must also consider
using military force in circumstances beyond self-defense in order
to provide for common security that underpins global stability – to
50
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support friends, participate in stability and reconstruction
operations, or confront mass atrocities.”22
The pacifist rhetoric of the Obama administration turned out to be quite
appealing to the voters. President Trump, on the other hand, introduced
hard power as necessary and attractive, but preventable. His international
priorities cover not only trade and economic issues, but also the essential
challenges to the American military power.23 The United States used smart
power consistently against Russia, North Korea and Iran. Washington also
applied the same smart approach to China after Beijing tried to veil the
rising wave of sickness in its border.
In conclusion, the article points to three findings that provides a better
understanding of smart power’s theoretical importance. First, smart power
theories do not subject claims about most likely cases. They provide a
flexible and plausible methodological approach by analyzing the use of
both hard and soft power in each case study. Second, smart power
concepts offer a two level theoretical approach that combines soft and
hard power. Only a two level combined approach rather than military
strategies or shuttle diplomacy can increase the strategic efficiency of
foreign policy decision making process and crisis management. Third,
smart power theories reveal that over focusing only on hard or soft power
is counterproductive. For example, use of conventional military forces
against invisible foes or diplomacy dialogues in times of illegal
annexations appears to be losing strategies. Smart power, on the contrary,
provides a strategic and constructive balance between hard and soft
power.

Defining the Concept of Smart Power
There is no single definition of smart power. Most of the existing theories
limit their definitions exclusively to foreign policy and information
technology. This section seeks to analyze the current discussion of smart
power theory in the context of U.S. National Security Policymaking.
Furthermore, the section contributes to the smart power debate by
introducing a modified, post-pandemic explanation of this concept. In
general, there are four basic theories of what the nature of smart power is.
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Joseph Nye’s Theory
Nye’s theory has a strategic nature. Nye defines smart power as a set of
smart strategies that combine the tools of both hard power (use of
coercion and payment) and soft power (obtaining preferred outcomes
through attraction).24 The former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton was
the first to integrate Nye’s concept in U.S. foreign policy. United States
President Barack Obama also relied on smart power in the fight against
global terrorism. Obama’s smart strategy included cutting military
spending and conducting more operations that are special.
In his theory, Nye emphasizes the need for strengthening the U.S. alliance
system and developing public diplomacy, economic integration and
technological innovations.25 It is precisely what defines alliances as the
most important precondition for the protection of U.S. National Security.26
In other words, the United States would not be able to effectively
implement the smart power approach without enhancing the U.S. alliance
system. This article supports Nye’s assumption. United States military
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan were indeed a proof of Washington's
military strength. However, relations with European allies deteriorated,
while China seized the opportunity to play a more active role in the world
market.
Last but not least, Nye describes smart power as the approach that allows
the United States to maintain its global leadership.27 Moreover, he
assumes that smart power is in fact a revision of the attractive power – a
tool that helped Washington to win the Cold War.28 U.S. Military and
American culture deterred Soviet aggression and Communism. Global
terrorism, however, is another case. Nye asserts that Washington cannot
win this war without using both hard and smart power.29 The author
concludes that U.S. Foreign policy faces five major challenges that will
require use of smart power: nuclear terrorism, political Islam, China’s rise,
oil crisis, and ecological breakdowns.30 Nye’s assertion is that only smart
power – a strategy that combines the soft power of attraction with the hard
power of coercion – will provide both Democrats and Republicans with the
winning foreign policy strategy. Thus, Joseph Nye legitimizes the strategic
importance this concept has for the U.S. global dominance.
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Ernest Wilson’s Theory
In contrast to Nye, Wilson describes smart power rather as a tool than a
strategy. Wilson’s explanation defines smart power as “the capacity of an
actor to combine elements of hard power and soft power in ways that are
mutually reinforcing such that the actor’s purposes advance effectively and
efficiently.”31 He assumes that no major actor in the international system
has the capacity to combine soft and hard power. For Wilson, smart power
is only a theoretical concept without practical application. This author
presents three arguments in support of his theory.
First, smart power requires knowledge of all the strengths and weaknesses
of hard and soft power.32 No major actor in international relations has full
knowledge of the other actors. Second, state actors do not have the
capacity to institutionalize smart power.33 Establishing an institution that
combines hard with soft power will require significant financial resources.
For example, the United States would spend three times as much as
Washington did in Afghanistan. Finally, there is no way to combine soft
and hard power mechanically.34 Such combination is a complicated
strategy that requires considerable political, economic, and military
resources.
Wilson also argues that the allies of hard power are much more numerous,
visible, and powerful than their soft power counterparts while smart power
needs a smart campaign.35 The institutional landscape of hard and soft
power needs a political and theoretical revision that will enable
Washington to sustain the balance between military and diplomacy.
Wilson admits that smart power is a step in the right direction but the lack
of hard – soft power balance creates strategic barriers to the effective use
of U.S. smart strategies. The author claims that hard power actors such as
the Pentagon marginalize soft power by creating institutional and political
tensions. United States diplomatic structures, on the other side, fail to
convince American people that soft power can advance the national
wellbeing. Wilson concludes that smart power is the best option for the
United States to ensure the Nation’s future. However, he rejects Nye’s
optimism that smart power is achievable in short term.
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Leslie Gelb’s Theory
A starting conception in Gelb’s theory is that the twenty-first-century is
highly pyramidal. Therefore, the United States is alone at the pinnacle,
with formidable and unique powers of global leadership, but without the
power to dominate.36 Russia, China, India, Brazil, Japan, Germany,
France, and Britain constitute the second level of the pyramid while
influential actors such as Saudi Arabia and Canada occupy the third. Gelb
believes that Washington needs a new strategy – not simply to lead, but
also to use U.S. power towards solving common problems.37 This new
Grand Design should rely on all dimensions of power – military,
economic, political, or diplomatic.38 In other words, the author admits that
the combination between hard and soft power is the right strategy for
maintaining the American leadership.
Gelb rejects the definitions of Nye and Wilson. Gelb’s theory assumes that
smart power is simply “a mechanical combining rather than a genuine
blending of the two ideas.”39 It is not a unique set of strategies, but rather
an alternation of weapons, diplomacy, and economic sanctions. Moreover,
Gelb believes that the U.S. Cold War strategies have not lost their
relevance after the collapse of the Soviet Bloc. For example, the policy of
containment would be much more effective than any smart power strategy
when it comes to China.40 Thus, Gelb does not support the smart approach
of Nye, but rather criticizes him for designing a mechanical blend of two
concepts.
Gelb also argues that the United States can preserve their influence over
global affairs only if Washington impose the American strategic interests
over the other major actors in international relations.41 This strategy has
three pillars: Unilateralism, use of force, and complete revision of the Cold
War doctrines. Gelb assumes that United States should not limit its efforts
to protecting national security. In this regard, Gelb's theory is inconsistent
with the definitions of Nye and Wilson. Gelb rejects Wilson's theory,
arguing that smart power is not just a theoretical concept but also an
existent tool of U.S. Foreign policy.42 However, he rejects Nye's definition
as well; emphasizing the nature of smart power is not unique to U.S.
National Security Policymaking.
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Paul Cammack’s Theory
Cammack claims that Nye’s theory is contradictory and untenable.
Cammack’s theory rejects Nye’s interpretation of smart power as a
multilateral approach.43 The author assumes that the United States can
preserve its global dominance only through unilateral use of hard power
while Nye's theory promotes multilateralism and good neighbor policy.
According to Cammack, Nye contradicts himself by asserting that alliance
building should be integral part of U.S. Foreign policy. If the United States
seeks to sustain its global leadership, the U.S. Grand Design should not
rely on multilateralism. Otherwise, America will not be a global leader but
only first among equals.
Cammack defines smart power as a repackaged version of soft power.44 He
argues that Joseph Nye's concept of smart strategy is unable to sustain the
American global dominance. On the contrary, the Unites States should
detract hard power from soft power in order to act as a rational global
actor because genuine smart power requires Washington to put common
interests above their own.45 In other words, smart power is a concept that
advocates liberal realist foreign policy. As such, it should include not only
multilateral agreements and coalition building but also use of military
force where it is necessary.
Cammack’s theory supports Nye in his assumption that American soft
power is in comprehensive crisis.46 Cammack believes that U.S. global
leadership is at stake precisely because Washington does not have a clear
foreign policy strategy. There are some specific issues on which America
should not lead, and other specific aspect, on which America cannot lead
in near future. The author asserts that the U.S. Grand Design should
relinquish the claim to leadership because there are scenarios where
common goals and approaches exist. Finally, Cammack concludes that if
America continues to follow the bound-to-lead principle Washington is
going to waste soft power resources.47
Pre-pandemic theories of Smart Power: A critical review
Nye, Wilson, Gelb, and Cammack have different perspectives on what
would have to change in U.S. Foreign policy. Smart power is the common
ground that builds the core of their theories. This article does not intend to
exaggerate the gap separating Joseph Nye’s theory from the others. Nye
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puts all pieces of hard and soft power together in a quite fruitful way to
shape the concept of smart power. His concept has become the main
alternative to hard and soft power theories that failed to determine the
future of U.S. Foreign policy after 9/11. Furthermore, Nye’s concept has
proven highly robust empirically and theoretically. From a strategic point
of view, smart power was successful – the United States sustained its
military, economic, and cultural leadership. Nye was also correct in his
belief that Washington faces five major challenges and needs smart power
to overcome them. Smart power turned out to be the winning strategy that
the United States needed to deter China and Russia, to fight ISIS and to
enhance the U.S. – led alliance system. The central problem is that the
Coronavirus outbreak undermined the theoretical core of smart power.
Nye points out that the combination of hard and soft power requires
contextual intelligence. He defines this term as intuitive diagnostic skills
that help policymakers align tactics with objectives to create smart
strategies.48 The Pandemic forced U.S. decision makers to address foreign
policy challenges by applying smart power in a less coherent and
distinctive manner. Their smart strategy failed because contextual
intelligence collapsed. This happened not only in the United States but
also in China, Russia, and Europe. The article assumes that Nye’s theory
can provide a considerable starting point for a new, post-pandemic
concept of smart power that will increase the geopolitical outcomes for
Washington.
Wilson shares a number of aspects with Nye. However, this article does
not support Wilson’s theory for three reasons. First, the U.S. Intelligence
Community has proven to be one of the most effective in collecting,
processing and storing information.49 Washington is well aware of the
strengths and weaknesses of all major U.S. adversaries. Second, U.S.
National Security Council has the institutional capacity to apply smart
power. NSC has been successfully developing and proposing strategies to
the White House for decades. In 2006, the Center for Strategic and
International Studies launched a bipartisan Commission on Smart Power.
The purpose of this institution is to develop a vision to guide U.S. global
engagement and to implement a smart power strategy.50 Third, the United
States has all necessary resources to combine hard with soft power. There
are many examples of smart operations, including the elimination of
Osama bin Laden and the fall of Muammar Gaddafi’s regime. Therefore,
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Washington has the capacity to apply smart power in its foreign policy and
to develop other smart approaches in short term.
Despite the strong arguments in favor of his pyramidal vision, Gelb tends
not to account for the actual effects of smart power. Three specific
limitations stand out in Gelb’s mechanical combining theory. First, U.S.
Cold War strategies are not applicable to U.S. National Security
Policymaking in 21st century, because the nature of war is constantly
changing. Conventional warfare has given way to cyberwarfare and hybrid
threats. Second, smart power requires contextual intelligence. The ability
of policymakers to create smart strategies by aligning tactics with
objectives allows the United States to exercise its superpower potential.
This is not simply a combination of hard and soft power but a strategy that
involves foreign policy decision making and crisis management. Finally yet
importantly, Gelb’s theory advocates revision of the Cold War doctrines
and this is precisely what endorses smart power. Containment was indeed
a successful strategy against the Soviet Union, but Chinese Communism
represents a different issue. Smart power, on the contrary, provides U.S.
decision makers with the contextual intelligence to deter China.
Cammack’s recasting of smart power provides a foundation for further
interpretations. However, there is a tension between his theory and the
other three. Nye, Wilson, and Gelb address smart power by analyzing its
efficiency, significance, and flexibility in the context of U.S. Foreign policy.
For Cammack smart power is a revised version of smart power. He argues
that hard power is the key to the American global dominance while smart
strategies cannot sustain the U.S. leadership. In fact, Cammack contradicts
himself by assuming that United States should unilaterally use hard power
by prioritizing common interests.51 U.S. unilateralism advocates one-sided
actions to protect U.S. national interests. Multilateralism and good
neighbor policy promote international cooperation and alliance building
efforts. Considering that smart power combines both approaches, it is
much more effective than hard power. This does not mean that Cammack’s
theory is of no importance but for authors who would defend his
assumption there is a problem. The author assumes that smart power is
ineffective because the United States should relinquish its claim for global
dominance. However, when the global balance of power changes one’s
theory should take into account perceptual variables such as polarity and
new security challenges such as the Coronavirus pandemic. Since global
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actors do not manipulate polarity scholars and policymakers are able to
develop new foreign policy tools such as smart power. Smart strategies
advocate U.S. involvement in the world affairs. Thus, smart power
promotes global leadership rather than isolationism.
Smart Power: Towards a Post-pandemic Explanation
Nye, Wilson, Gelb, and Cammack provide a plausible starting point for a
further explanation of their concepts. This article introduces a new
definition of smart power by employing two approaches sequentially: The
four basic definitions and the structural approach of theory building. The
article assumes that there are three additional aspects of smart power:
smart target, smart strategy and smart face. They are the binding
connection between hard and soft power in U.S. Foreign policy. Therefore,
smart power has five dimensions:
•

•
•

•

•

Hard Power. It includes economic sanctions, political pressure, or
the use of military. The purpose of hard power is to defeat the
enemy.
Soft Power. It involves the use of intangible sources of influence
that weaken the adversary: Values, dialogue, and diplomacy.
Smart target. The use of smart power requires a smart target.
Target is smart when realistic. If the target is not realistic, it may
result in overfocusing on either hard or soft power. In the first case,
military operations exhaust the economy, forcing it into recession.
In the second case, diplomacy fails and the military takes over.
Smart Strategy. Resources spent on smart power should not
outweigh the benefits. Whether it is arms, money, advertising or
promoting values the smart strategy must follow clear priorities.
Any use of smart power outside these priorities can result in a
complete failure of the strategy.
Smart Face. The faces of war are weapons and destruction. The
faces of diplomacy are treaties and agreements. The face of smart
power depicts certain hard power action as inevitable, necessary
and attractive.

In conclusion, this article defines smart power as a five dimensional
strategy that combines the tools of hard and soft power and seeks to
achieve a realistic target, at a reasonable cost under conditions that seem
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to be unavoidable, necessary, and at the same time attractive. Smart
target, smart strategy, and smart face are the smart essence that
transforms hard and soft into smart power. Smart essence is in fact the
contextual intelligence that provides decision makers with smart tactics.
After all, the primary task of decision makers is to set up a smart strategy
by considering resources and predicting outcomes. Some would argue that
this definition is similar to the other explanations. The explanation of this
article indeed reflects other definitions because smart power theory
presupposes continuity and consistency. However, the article reshapes the
concept of contextual intelligence by emphasizing on three additional
aspects that are methodologically vital to decision making and crisis
management – target, resources, and outcomes. All of them are relevant to
the challenges the United States are facing during the Coronavirus
pandemic.

U.S. Foreign Policy and the Pandemic: Basic Implications
To say that smart power is the key to the American geopolitical dominance
is neither to overestimate this concept, nor to accuse the United States of
imposing its global leadership. In the following section, the article points
out five basic implications on U.S. Foreign policy relevant to the Pandemic
outbreak. Each implication corresponds to a different dimension of smart
power. The assumption that smart power still occupies a primary position
in U.S. Foreign policy is a logical starting point for this analysis.
First, the United States should continue to unilaterally use hard power to
support COVID-19 affected countries and regions. This strategy will limit
Chinese influence in strategic regions such as Central Africa and Latin
America. In addition, humanitarian hard power can replace the old school
military strategies with a new generation of interventions:
A humanitarian military intervention is referred to as a type of
foreign military intervention that responds to a situation in which a
government severely represses the human rights of its own people;
thus, it intends to save lives, to relieve suffering, and/or to
distribute foodstuffs to prevent starvation.52
In the light of the Coronavirus pandemic, humanitarian interventions and
military power are two sides of the same coin. While liberals argue that,
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the purpose of an intervention is to protect victims of human rights
violations, realists contend that interventions have little relation to
humanitarian concerns and aim, instead, at certain national interests such
as securing an oil supply.53 Washington should take advantage of this
opportunity to uphold the U.S. global influence and to raise the U.S. global
approval rating. For example, Washington may apply a modified Marshall
Plan strategy at a global level. Thus, the United States will successfully
counter Russia's growing influence in Europe and Chinese presence in
APAC.
Second, America needs to sustain and develop the U.S. alliance system.
Indeed, that is what Washington achieved after World War II: It used softpower resources to draw others into a system of alliances and institutions
that has lasted for 60 years.54 Any military escalation is undesirable, as it
will drain the U.S. economy. United States should reaffirm the Nation’s
commitment to all U.S. allies. Moreover, Washington must convince them
that America has the political will to protect its partners. Russia and China
are systematically trying to undermine the confidence in the U.S.
leadership among key U.S. allies, such as Germany and Japan. The United
States should not allow geopolitical compromises that would cost
Washington post-Cold War spheres of influence.
Third, the United States has to avoid geopolitical temptations such as
isolationism. Were the United States to cede its global leadership role, it
would forgo these proven upsides while exposing itself to the
unprecedented downsides of a world in which the country was less secure,
prosperous, and influential.55 Despite all negative effects of the pandemic,
the United States still holds the strategic economic balance. At this stage,
China does not have the economic potential to disintegrate the Bretton
Woods system. However, Washington should keep an eye on Beijing's
attempts to manipulate the Yuan. This common Chinese strategy poses a
long-term challenge to the U.S. dollar’s dominance.
Fourth, Washington should build a smart strategy that promotes smart
power and minimizes the use of hard power. The post-Cold War order is a
world order building on principles that emphasize inclusiveness and selfrestraint among major powers.56 America can partially preserve this order
by designing a smart approach and revising the Cold War containment
strategy. For example, Washington should seek to convince the rest of the
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world that a Chinese-led international order is not an alternative to the
U.S. dominated security architecture.
Fifth, the smart face of U.S. Foreign policy should change completely by
adopting the principle of dumb war under a smart mask. Washington has
to depict hard power as inevitable, but not attractive and necessary.
Because extreme weather, terrorist attacks, and health epidemics are
inevitable, citizens should rely less upon outside assistance and depend
more upon their personal resources, enabling communities for the future
disasters.57 In other words, the United States must change the face of war.
Cybersecurity strategies have to replace conventional warfare scenarios.
Washington won the Cold War by investing in emerging technologies,
while the USSR accumulated weapons that never came into use. China is
now trying to turn this strategy against the United States.
Operationalizing these implications is only the first step to the explanation
of the post-pandemic smart power concept. By focusing on the postpandemic reality in the next section, this article moves beyond theoretical
discussions and current implications to explanations how smart power
could affect U.S. Foreign policy. Therefore, the second step is to analyze
the potential effects that the Corona virus will have on America.

United States after the Coronavirus: Strategic Implications
This section begins by discussing to what extent the Coronavirus pandemic
could affect U.S. Foreign policy. The section seeks to answer the question
by operationalizing three variables: Polarity, Security, and Leadership.
This article joins the debate by reasserting the statement that the
Coronavirus pandemic will not change the global order. However, the
Corona virus could affect the following aspects of Washington’s Foreign
policy.
China
China will remain the strongest adversary of the United States in the postpandemic age. In the years since 9/11, the Chinese Grand Design tried to
displace America from the world stage.58 The starting point for Beijing’s
strategy is APAC. There is a little chance that China will directly intervene
in the region. However, Chinese Communist Party has a long history of
using North Korea as cannon fodder against Japan and South Korea. Latin
61
https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol13/iss3/3
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.13.3.1829

Ivanov: Reshaping U.S. Smart Power: Towards a Post-Pandemic Security Arch

America and Africa are also an important part of the Chinese Grand
Design. Although Latin American countries are, still the backyard of
Washington, China will not hesitate to launch more economic
interventions in this region.
Therefore, the United States should use the full branch of U.S. economic
levers to deter the Chinese strategy. America is a major investor in major
international organizations such as the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund. Since the end of World War II, the Bretton Woods system
has established the dollar as a major reserve currency. Although the Yuan
is, also a reserve currency China and Russia are unable to dethrone the
dollar domination. Beijing, however, can severely limit Washington's
influence in the global economic organizations by using the potential
effects of the recession. Therefore, the United States should not suspend
the financial support for those institutions.
Finally, America should invest more in the development of emerging
technologies. Washington needs to improve the U.S. cyber defense
potential. Second, the United States should develop a Unified Strategy for
countering Hybrid Threats. Over the last few years, China has developed
high-level cyber spyware capabilities that could pose a challenge to U.S.
National Security.59 For example, the Chinese hacker group “Javaphile”,
that attempted to hack the White House website has a formal relationship
with the Shangai Public Security Bureau.60 Beijing’s strategies improve
steadily as presently cyber-attacks aims to affect not only the U.S.
information infrastructure but also to access classified information. This is
crucial for the U.S. National Security Policymaking. In the wake of the
Corona virus, these attempts are becoming more common.
Russia
Russia will be the second major opponent of Washington. Some have
argued that Russia is not a U.S. National Security challenge and that now,
more than ever, the Kremlin and the White House must work together to
overcome the crisis.61 This article does not support such point of view.
Russia is not a U.S. ally. Russian hybrid warfare is a challenge not only to
Europe, but to the United States as well. For example, during the
Pandemic, Russia is trying to undermine Europe's confidence in America
and to disrupt the Euro Atlantic relations. The starting poins for this
strategy are Eastern Europe and the European states which suffered the
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most COVID-19 casualties. In his open letter, the Russian Ambassador to
Croatia Mr. Anvar Azimov states that European Union’s main ally, the
United States of America, in recent years earned the reputation of a
country that creates rather than solves problems.62 Following the
Coronavirus outbreak in Europe, the Russian government sent Italy a
military convoy of medical supplies. The humanitarian aid that Vladimir
Putin sent to his Italian counterpart turned out to be more than an
ordinary military operation. Leading Italian media have shown that much
of the Russia aid is useless.63 In response, the spokesman for Russian
Defense Minister Igor Konashekov made a direct threat to the Italian
media investigating Russian support for Italy.64 These actions of the
Russian Federation show that Moscow has not given up its hybrid strategy
to contain U.S. influence in Europe.
Another important actor in the U.S. – Russian relations is the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). NATO is the most successful
military alliance in the U.S. history.65 U.S. military presence in Europe
prevents Russia from expanding its influence on the Old Continent and
guarantees U.S. National Interests in the region. However, Moscow still
has two effective tools to influence the decision making process in the
European capitals: gas and ideology. Russian energy projects such as
Turkish Stream and Nord Stream have dictated the political course of a
few European governments in Eastern Europe, which have not been
determined to oppose Moscow. Russian far right movements enjoy great
support from a number of European politicians, who declared themselves
the new conservatives whose mission is to defend traditional European
values from global liberal elites. Thus, slowly and imperceptibly Russia has
shaped its own doctrine of smart power.
Moscow's smart strategy in Europe has one key purpose – to convince
European allies that they can no longer rely on the United States and
NATO. If the Russian strategy succeeds, European member states of the
Alliance could renegotiate and move beyond Article 5 of the Washington
Treaty to build their own defense capabilities. NATO will not die, it will
transform into a global military alliance that will continue to serve the U.S.
Foreign policy. This article assumes that such scenario will
unconditionally damage the European security architecture for three
reasons. First, Europe does not have the economic resources to maintain
high-tech military equipment. Less than 1.5% of the EU Growth Domestic
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Product goes for defense expenditures.66 Second, most of the European
countries do not have the political will to create Joint Armed Forces of
Europe. France has initiated such projects many times, but then
abandoned them on its own because of the prospect of German leadership.
Finally, without NATO there will be a resurgence of European nationalism.
This will lead to the disintegration of the EU.
Middle East and North Africa
The Coronavirus pandemic will inevitably shift the balance of power in the
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) by challenging the U.S. military
presence in the region.67 This article argues that the United States should
reduce the use of hard power in MENA. Large-scale combat operations are
exhausting and expensive. There are high risks to the deployment of
military personnel in regions where the Coronavirus pandemic continues
to grow. Covert operations and clandestine activities, on the other side, are
cheaper and resilient. Some would argue that strategic surprise often
comes because of intelligences failures. Even so, smart power has the
capacity to provide a better coordination between U.S. Intelligence
Community and decision makers at the highest political levels. United
States military presence in MENA should remain a priority for all
Presidential administrations. However, the National Military Strategy for
the post-pandemic age should be restraining, not offensive. For example,
the potential withdrawal of the U.S. troops from Afghanistan is not a
reasonable option because it would lead to the emergence of a second ISIS.
The first ISIS emerged in 2014 from the remnants of Al-Qaeda. Following
the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq, religious radicals allied with
Saddam’s former colonels, who survived the war. Together, they
established ISIS and declared a Caliphate. This scenario could repeat in
Afghanistan, where the Taliban have consistently violated the peace deal
with the United States.
Israel and Saudi Arabia remain key U.S. allies in MENA, while Iran poses a
challenge to the American national interests in the region. Syria is a hot
spot, because of the Russian military presence in the country. Another
non-rational actor in this region is Turkey. United States–Turkish
relations quickly deteriorated after the unsuccessful coup d’état attempt
from 2016. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan took a political
course towards centralizing political power and eliminating the
opposition. Moreover, as a NATO member state, Turkey openly challenged
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the United States by purchasing S-400 missile system from Russia.
Despite the economic sanctions and all human casualties, Iran will pose a
long-term challenge to Washington. Allegedly, despite the tensions
between the two countries, the United States will not go to war against
Iran, since the war will not grant Washington interests and will impose a
huge cost on the U.S. nation.68 Part of this is true. Although the United
States is capable of defeating Iran in a military conflict, the Trump
administration is highly unlikely to risk the use of hard power until the
end of the pandemic. On the other hand, a military conflict between Iran
and Israel is highly probable if Washington decides to tighten economic
sanctions on the Islamic Republic.
Of course, Washington could suspend U.S. military aid to Israel and could
withdraw U.S. political support for Saudi Arabia. This article assumes that
such course of actions will be a strategic mistake for two reasons. First,
U.S. – Israel relations are one of the most salient characteristics of U.S.
Foreign policy. The American support for the Jewish state is essential
because Israel is Washington’s most reliable ally against Iran and Syria.
Moreover, Israel provides an outpost testing for the U.S. arms companies
considering the permanent conflicts in the region. Finally yet importantly,
Israeli Intelligence Community has a long standing practice of constructive
cooperation with U.S. Intelligence by sharing data on potential threats for
U.S. National Security. Second, Saudi Arabia is in a period of ongoing
reforms that could be a major opportunity for the United States to reshape
the balance of power in MENA.
Asia Pacific
This article argues that the United States needs to strengthen its presence
in two key points of the APAC – Japan and South Korea. China is trying to
establish control over this region through one of the major U.S.
adversaries – North Korea. However, Pyongyang is not a rational actor
and does not always follow the strategies of Beijing. South Korea alone
cannot counter a potential military threat from North Korea. Therefore,
Japan needs additional U.S. support to deter Pyongyang’s nuclear
diplomacy.
Some scholars and decision makers make claims that the United States
should negotiate a new strategic agreement with Japan that will allow the
Japanese government to increase Tokyo’s military capabilities.69 Such
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agreement would require essential reforms of Article 9 of the Japanese
Constitution. This article does not support such an alternative because of
the potential consequences it would have for Japan. A major reform of
Article 9 will allow Tokyo to revise the Yoshida Defense Doctrine and to
adopt an offensive military doctrine. From an ideological point of view, the
new military strategy of Japan could revive Japanese nationalism from the
pre-World War II period. From a strategic point of view, a potential
military reform of the Japanese Self Defense Forces could force the
Japanese government to change its non-nuclear policy in the face of the
North Korean threat. If Japan decides to launch its own nuclear project
this will reshape the balance of powers in APAC to the detriment of South
Korea and Indonesia.
The article concludes that the Coronavirus pandemic could affects U.S.
Foreign policy in four strategic directions: U.S. – China relations, U.S. –
Russia relations, U.S. military and strategic involvement in MENA and
APAC. However, hard power and soft power are still subject to two
objective limitations: it is easier to fight a war than to achieve peace but it
is cheaper to sustain peace than to fight a war. Obviously, U.S. smart
power matters most in relations with allies and adversaries. Therefore,
avoiding the strategic temptation of over focusing on hard or smart power
will be the greatest geopolitical challenge that U.S. Foreign policy will face
during the Pandemic.

Pre-pandemic vs Post-pandemic Smart Power: Sustaining U.S.
Global Leadership
This section explains how the post-pandemic concept of smart power in
this article would benefit the strategic implications of U.S. Foreign policy.
The best way to determine the influence of smart power on Washington’s
Foreign policy would be to analyze each implication by operationalizing
the five dimensional structure of the revised concept. However, two
methodological problems could affect the outcome of this analysis. A first
difficulty is that most decision makers and scholars are still skeptical of the
Pandemic’s end in near future. A second problem lies in the determining
what will be U.S. Foreign policy under the next Presidential
administrations. Therefore, the article’s assumptions do not pretend to be
unambiguously acceptable or universally accurate. The validity of the
arguments, however, rests on two perceptions, that are integral part of
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Joseph Nye’s theory. First, the Pandemic will not dethrone America as
global leader. Second, smart power will guarantee the American global
leadership in the post-pandemic age.70
China
Washington’s smart approach towards Beijing should include the
following steps:
•
•
•
•

•

Hard Power: Forging a military coalition between the United States,
Australia, and Japan in South China Sea.
Soft Power: Imposing diplomatic sanctions on China over Uyghur
rights and Hong Kong’s autonomy.
Smart Target: Economic, political, diplomatic, and cultural
containment of Chinese global influence.
Smart Strategy: Supporting Taiwan’s independence and providing
anti-government movements in China with enough resources to
undermine the legitimacy of the Communist regime.
Smart Face: Recognizing Tibet as independent nation by formally
establishing diplomatic relations with the sovereign country.

Opponent of this doctrine would argue that such strategy is aggressive and
highly offensive. This claim is timely because the last decade has witnessed
a continuous debate over China’s ambitions to replace the United States as
a global leader. For these reasons, many believe that the American strategy
towards Beijing should be soft. The might even choose to criticize military
coalitions or diplomatic sanctions over Uyghur rights. However, those
critics overlook the consequences of the Coronavirus pandemic. The
classic justification of global leadership is to act at any time anywhere in
the world. So far, only the United States has the willingness and the
capacity to act as a global major actor in international relations. Advocates
of the Chinese leadership seek to convince American allies that the
Pandemic will affect Washington’s potential of superpower. For that
reason, the United States has to act more decisively than ever.
Russia
The U.S. smart approach on Russia should include the following aspects:
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•
•
•

•
•

Hard Power: Economic sanctions under the Countering America's
Adversaries Through Sanctions Act.
Soft Power: Media coverage of human rights violations in Russia.
Smart Target: Containment of Russian energy influence in EU and
NATO member states through enhanced cooperation in the U.S. –
EU Energy Council.
Smart Strategy: Humanitarian, financial and military support for
the European allies.
Smart Face: Deterrence of Russia by relocating more U.S. troops on
NATO’s Eastern flank.

This article is in support of the second option for three reasons. On the
contrary, the smart scenario will improve and consolidate Euro-Atlantic
relations despite the economic tensions between Washington and
Brussels. Thus, smart power will satisfy both U.S. National Interests and
European need of collective defense.
Middle East and North Africa
The second alternative rests on five smart pillars:
•
•

•
•
•

Hard Power: Providing military aid to Israel, imposing more
economic sanctions on Iran, and continuing the fight against ISIS.
Soft Power: Expressing political support for Saudi Arabia,
encouraging the Israeli – Palestinian peace talks, and imposing
diplomatic criticism on Turkey.
Smart Target: Reshaping the balance of power in the Middle East
by establishing an open Israeli–Saudi partnership.
Smart Strategy: Allocating enough financial resources to defeat ISIS
and initiate cooperation between Israel and Saudi Arabia.
Smart Face: Maintaining U.S. military presence in MENA.

Some will argue that this smart scenario is impossible or inconsistent with
the cultural cleavages that exist in this region. Such statement is
methodologically misleading because it takes into account only cultural
variables. This article argues that for the United States those cleavages
might be an opportunity not an obstacle. Israel and Saudi Arabia have one
major adversary – Iran. If the partnership between the two states deepens,
Tehran will also strengthen its ties with the other Russian allies in the
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region. Turkey will finally have to choose a side as a NATO member state.
The rest of the MENA countries will either follow Iran or support the
partnership between Israel and Saudi Arabia. This will make it much
easier for the United States to balance Russian influence in MENA.
Asia Pacific
Washington’s smart approach in APAC should include the following steps:
•
•

•
•
•

Hard Power: Keeping U.S. troops in Japan and South Korea.
Soft Power: Promoting the concept of special relations between
United States and Japan as cornerstone of peace and security in
APAC.
Smart Target: Deterring the North Korean nuclear diplomacy
towards South Korea and Japan.
Smart Strategy: Providing military support for Seoul and Tokyo.
Smart Face: Launching more military exercises on the Korean
Peninsula.

This scenario will maintain the balance of power in the region for two
reasons. First, Tokyo will give up on his plans for a military reform,
convinced that Washington will fulfill its commitments to Japan under the
Treaty for Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and
Japan. Second, the smart approach will consolidate Japan and South
Korea largely, despite the economic and historical tensions between Tokyo
and Seoul.
This section aimed to prove that the post-pandemic concept of smart
power is not only a theoretical discussion. It also has a practical
significance. More broadly, such a concept can contribute in overcoming
the negative geopolitical consequences of the Coronavirus pandemic.
Critics of smart power are right in assessing smart power as less effective
than before the Corona virus. However, they are wrong in their belief that
the United States should abandon smart power as foreign policy tool.
Their criticism has no trouble exploring how U.S. Foreign policy needs a
new strategy. Their problem is with smart power. However, they fail to
explain why the United States sustained their global leadership after 9/11.
Therefore, such criticism of this type does not give enough empirically
tested arguments.
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Conclusion
The Coronavirus pandemic will have a huge impact on the global security
architecture. Therefore, Washington should seize the opportunity to adapt
to the post-pandemic geopolitical realities. The United States needs a
subsequent strategy to preserve its global dominance. This conclusion
summarizes the article’s main arguments by suggesting four
recommendations for the post-pandemic nature of the U.S. smart
approach. The Coronavirus pandemic will not change the global order but
it will reshape the global security architecture. However, the rise of the
Post-Pandemic World Order will not mark the end of U.S. global
dominance.71 This section outlines two scenarios for the U.S. role in the
post-pandemic world. Each scenario corresponds to a different
geopolitical configuration.
First scenario: U.S. dominated security architecture. In this scenario, the
United States will remain a global leader. Washington will maintain its
global military presence and cultural dominance. Cross-border terrorist
networks will no longer have the resources to large-scaled terrorist attacks.
Iran will remain under the pressure of the U.S. sanctions while relations
between Israel and Saudi Arabia will improve. Russia will sustain heavy
losses and Moscow will not be able to achieve economic recovery. Under
this scenario, China will lose the disinformation warfare and Beijing will
be under pressure to take responsibility for the Coronavirus pandemic.
This act will delegitimize the Communist regime to such extent that China
will have to give up its hegemonic ambitions.
Second scenario: A new bipolar system. Under this scenario, the
Coronavirus pandemic will result in the emergence of a bipolar security
architecture. However, this confrontation will be much different from the
Cold War because Communist China bears no relation to Soviet Russia.
Washington and Beijing will simply need allies to maintain the strategic
balance in the international system. Although Russia has a little to offer,
China will need Moscow as Beijing is not yet ready to sustain global
military presence. The United States will have to renegotiate NATO and
reaffirm Washington’s commitment to all U.S. allies. The Sino-Russian
bloc will have to combine Russian hard power with Chinese smart power.
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The Euro-Atlantic bloc, on the other side, will have to revise the Cold War
containment strategy and adapt it to the new geopolitical realities.
In conclusion, smart power gives little place for the major U.S. adversaries
and provides the United States with enough resources to preserve the U.S.led international order. This objective is true not only for the current U.S.
foreign policy implications but also for the strategic implications that will
emerge in the post-pandemic security architecture. Without defying, the
geopolitical potential of the American adversaries such as China, Russia,
and Iran this article argues that the United States will maintain their
global leadership in the post-pandemic age. China’s rise brought
international relations to the point where it challenged the U.S.-led
international order. However, there is still a big political, economic,
military, and cultural disproportion between the geostrategic potential of
Washington and Beijing. Thus, a new bipolar system would be rather a
foreign policy temptation for China than geopolitical reality for America.
In long-term, the new concept of smart power will ensure U.S. global
dominance. In short-term, it will minimize the geopolitical casualties of
the post-pandemic transition.
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